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internationalism as a 
current in the peace 
movement: a symposium 
It is apparent from the literature on the peace movement and diplo-
matic thought throughout this century that an exploration of the some-
times contradictory use of the word internationalism is in order. Not only 
has it been used for different purposes by competing factions of the anti-
war movement and political leaders, but it has differing connotations for 
historians. This symposium is a contribution to a discussion of the term. 
Instead of asking for an abstract formulation, the editors invited several 
scholars to consider the roles of internationalist ideas in the peace move-
ment in the hope that a functional definition might emerge, one which 
might stimulate formal analyses and eventuate in a working understand-
ing. By way of opening the discussion, the editors asked Sondra Herman, 
the author of Eleven Against War: Studies in American Internationalist 
Thought, 1898-1921 (Stanford: Hoover Institution, 1969) to identify some 
conceptual problems that arise from her analysis. 
From the last decade of the nineteenth 
century through the first world war of the 
twentieth, a small but prominent group of 
American intellectuals and peace advocates 
argued for a distinctive approach to foreign 
relations which they called international-
ism. They represented a minority of the articulate public, probably a 
minority of the peace societies. They advanced ideas that were being 
heard also in Europe, and they debated the forms of international organi-
zation for years before President Woodrow Wilson took up their cause. 
When Wilson did use international ideals in his explanation of American 
mediation policy, and later of American war aims, he adjusted them 
considerably to the national interest. 
These assumptions which touched so lightly national policy-making 
are familiar ones; progress toward peace is a real possibility, the inter-
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nationalists held, and imperial rivalries intensified by the communica-
tions revolution have made international organization a necessity. In 
spite of the political independence of nations, which is natural, their 
economic, social and moral interdependence require new forms of polit-
ical organization. Balance of power diplomacy, the traditional statecraft, 
cannot prevent wars. 
Beyond these beliefs and a general sense of obligation to educate the 
public to them through concrete plans and models, the internationalists 
were united by very little. Specifically, the internationalists divided into 
two groups during the First World War. 
One wing, the political internationalists (or institutionalists) advo-
cated the development of legal machinery for the peaceful settlement of 
disputes. Some proposed a league to compel consideration of inter-
national disputes. They conceived of the world as an atomistic polity in 
which nations pursued their interests competitively. They believed that 
a world court of a League to Enforce Peace could civilize the natural 
aggressiveness of men, and that the rivalrous relations of nations could 
have a peaceful evolution. 
The other wing of the movement included community international-
ists. Although they did not ignore the possibilities of juridical and 
political organization, they did assert that such formal arrangements in 
themselves could never prevent wars. What was needed was the develop-
ment of a more organic world consciousness, a sense of international 
community among the peoples of different nations. These community in-
ternationalists proposed such economic and social changes as the disallow-
ance of trade advantages, international regulation of the world's food 
supply, international insurance for natural disasters, international control 
of the arms industry and of former colonies, and international health and 
educational programs. They believed that such activity would undermine 
contentious nationalism which itself was the distraint of collective se-
curity; but they did not say how the antagonistic nations could be per-
suaded to adopt such an approach. 
The first question that arises about these two forms of international-
ism is: How did the advocates of one type differ from the advocates of 
the other? I believe that the supporters of the legal-political methods-
men such as Nicholas Murray Butler, Elihu Root and leaders of the 
League to Enforce Peace—had a different world view from that of com-
munity internationalists such as Jane Addams, Josiah Royce and Thor-
stein Veblen. The institutionalists held to conservative Darwinism, the 
Anglo-American understanding, and belief in American democratic capi-
talism, while the communalists expressed many doubts about the com-
petitive ethic. The communalists interpreted human nature in more 
dynamic terms than the institutionalists did, believing that men defined 
themselves largely through changing relations with others. In brief, forms 
of internationalism reflected more general social philosophies. 
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Finally, it appears as though the social position of the communalists 
differed considerably from that of the institutionalists. The political in-
ternationalists either headed large organizations or associated themselves 
with the government. They thought in terms of making policy affecting 
many other people. Community internationalists identified themselves 
with the international community of scholarship or with the disinherited. 
Applying this distinction to the history of American internationalism 
since the turn of the century raises questions such as the following: 
1. How was the growth of internationalism just before and during 
World War I related to the expansion of American power, on the one 
hand, and the threat of revolution, on the other? For political inter-
nationalists the League of Nations became a vehicle of American influ-
ence in the world and the "road away from revolution." Was resistance 
to substantive changes in power relationships among nations, or among 
classes implicit in political internationalism from the beginning? Was 
political internationalism fundamentally an elaborate form of Pax Amer-
icana} Political internationalists believed that the spread of Anglo-
American institutions and of capitalism aided the causes of peace in the 
world. Many internationalists were also enthusiastic expansionists in 
1898, and this form of internationalism increased markedly with the 
growth of American economic influence abroad. On the other hand, there 
is little evidence that the institutionalists wanted the United States to be-
come the world's policeman. They emphasized collective responsibility 
for peace-keeping. 
2. Was internationalism a revolt against the nation-state? In particu-
lar, were the communalists seeking unrealizable goals? In some respects 
the communalists appear realistic. They understand very well the exac-
erbated nationalism of the war years. Yet they were overly hopeful of 
transcending national loyalties, if only certain conditions were met. 
Veblen's plan for a league of neutrals and Royce's plan for international 
insurance were never tested, but to some extent Jane Addams' proposals 
have been fulfilled in the work of U.N. specialized agencies. Do people in 
poorer areas of the world identify more closely with the U.N. under the 
impact of these agencies than citizens of richer nations do? Is there any 
evidence to suggest that extensive activity by world organizations on be-
half of human welfare weakens fundamental national distinctions? 
3. Is there evidence that fundamental positions in relation to foreign 
policy have social correlates? Is identification with an "inner" group or 
with the "establishment" important in establishing fundamentally con-
servative approaches to foreign policy? 
4. What beliefs and identifications distinguished the American pacifist 
from the American internationalist since World War I? This is a difficult 
question in view of the fact that some members of the peace movement 
claimed the position of both pacifism and internationalism, but it is im-
portant in order to establish the legitimacy of their claims. Some plans 
191 
for international organization required the international use of force, and 
many internationalists willingly went to war in 1917 and 1941, in Korea 
and even in Vietnam. How exactly does their position differ from that of 
pacifists who also profess international goals? 
5. Why did internationalism have such a limited appeal? Community 
internationalism hardly seemed to have a public at all, and political in-
ternationalism only developed a significant one when the League to En-
force Peace was organized, and more particularly when Wilson lent the 
cause his eloquent voice, before World War I. Why did internationalists 
fail to educate the public for the long-range commitment that inter-
nationalism requires? 
6. How did internationalist movements abroad compare with Amer-
ican movements? Were they stronger by virtue of their association with 
socialism? 
7. Did the Cold War kill American internationalism? Belief in the 
future of the United Nations appeared, superficially at least, quite strong 
and popular after World War II. Was this more than an emotional re-
action to the war itself? Was it an acceptance of American responsibility 
in the world or an escape from it? When did this belief in effective U.N. 
action disappear? Did Americans begin to identify American police ac-
tion with internationalism around the time of the Korean war? Has 
internationalism today become equivalent to American intervention, in 
popular thinking? There is a live peace movement today, of course, but 
is it characterized by the old-fashioned faith in international organization 
or international community? 
America's sense of uniqueness and of des-
tiny, coupled with the facts of international 
life in the nineteenth century, promoted 
that unilateralism in foreign relations 
which is generally labelled isolationism. 
Paradoxically, it also encouraged specula-
tion on the gradual evolution of a "United States of the World," in which 
nations would join together, democratically and under a system of law, 
much in the manner of the American colonies in 1776 and with similarly 
beneficial results. Historians, long fascinated by the isolationist tradition, 
have recently begun to turn their attention to this "internationalist" 
component of American thought and are attempting to trace its mani-
festations. 
The results of their investigations, though often only implicit, are 
clear enough: aside from pacifist visionaries like William Ladd and Elihu 
Burritt, dabblers in international relations like Andrew Carnegie and 
Edward Ginn, and theorists like Josiah Royce and Thorstein Veblen 
whose primary concerns really lay elsewhere, there were virtually no 




fully described as internationalists, and there was certainly no interna-
tionalist movement of any significance. 
Benjamin Franklin, to be sure, published Pierre-André Gargaz's 
scheme for a European union with an approving introduction in the 
1780's, and even speculated about an Anglo-French-American compact. 
Fifty years later, John Quincy Adams, John C. Calhoun and Daniel 
Webster, among others, judged the American Peace Society's essay contest 
on the subject of a Congress of Nations. Charles Sumner championed 
arbitration as a prelude to international confederation in the 1870's, and 
Andrew Dickson White and Captain Alfred Thayer Mahan led to the 
Hague Conference of 1899 an American delegation which carried with it 
a plan for the establishment of an international court. But all of these 
men would rank very high on any list of American nationalists, and their 
"internationalism" must therefore be taken cum granum salis. 
The fact that they and other prominent and influential Americans 
lent their names and their efforts to schemes looking toward the forma-
tion of international assemblies and tribunals during the nineteenth 
century is actually neither very surprising nor especially significant. The 
American experiment, after all, was one of parliamentary democracy 
under law, and the dynamic of American society was provided by the 
belief that this experiment could be made to work at home and serve as 
a model for the rest of the world. Americans, moreover, looked favorably 
on the peaceful resolution of international disputes because they believed 
the maintenance of an extensive military establishment to be destructive 
of democratic government. In the abstract, therefore, the setting up of 
parliamentary or judicial bodies which might deal with disputes among 
nations as Congress and the Supreme Court dealt with disputes among 
the several states had considerable appeal, as did the notion that an inter-
national community and a recognized body of international law should 
be developed. 
But Americans during the nineteenth century also had their sights set 
resolutely inward, and considered the problems of the world only inci-
dentally, when at all. Even within the reform movement, the American 
Peace Society, the sole group with international overtones, had both a 
smaller following and a lesser impact than did organizations concerned 
with more immediately relevant issues such as education, prison reform 
and the abolition of slavery. The establishment of national consciousness 
and national unity, the maintenance of these in the face of conflicting 
sectional interests, particularly with regard to slavery, and the "road to 
reunion" after the Civil War were the central American concerns. In this 
context, "internationalism," though philosophically appealing, could be 
pursued only so long as it appeared to be an extension of, rather than an 
alternative to, the pervasive nationalism. Speculation about a "parliament 
of man" was possible, as was the advocacy of arbitration, but only so long 
as the results, both actual and expected, were seen as serving the national 
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interest. What was pursued, therefore, was not internationalism at all, 
but simply a geographically expanded nationalism. 
When America turned physically outward near the end of the nine-
teenth century, the situation did not change. The visible and tangible 
success of the American experiment, when measured in territory, wealth 
and power, heightened both national pride and national self-confidence. 
The United States entered the world arena after the Spanish-American 
War more convinced than ever that its ideas and institutions, or at least 
its version of Anglo-Saxon ideals and institutions, were destined to domi-
nate the globe, and more confident than ever that this country could 
resolve any international problems it might encounter by itself and in its 
own way. 
By expanding its trade and investments abroad and by becoming a 
factor in the power calculations of other nations, the United States was 
drawn increasingly into international discussions and contacts. Under 
the leadership of Theodore Roosevelt, who revelled in the limelight of 
the international stage, the United States mediated the Russo-Japanese 
War, sired the Algeciras Conference, promoted the Open Door in the 
Pacific, and claimed the role of international policeman in the Caribbean. 
But none of this should be confused with a turn to internationalism. 
The archetypal American "internationalist" of these years, Henry 
Cabot Lodge, was an expansionist who recognized that American isola-
tion had ended and, therefore, opted for a larger world role for the 
United States, flirted briefly with the League to Enforce Peace, argued 
eloquently that "nations must unite as men unite in order to preserve 
peace and order," and favored this country's "taking a suitable part and 
bearing a due responsibility in world affairs." But Lodge was primarily 
an American nationalist who fought the League of Nations because he 
correctly saw the conflict between the genuine internationalism inherent 
in the Covenant and his own views regarding national sovereignty and 
national independence. Indeed, the reservations he proposed were aimed 
directly at the elimination of those aspects of the League which might 
have placed international considerations above narrowly national con-
cerns. 
Woodrow Wilson and his followers, of course, were in theory prepared 
to give genuine internationalism a try, though it is doubtful whether even 
they would have been willing to surrender a significant portion of Amer-
ican sovereignty to the League in actual practice. But it was precisely the 
internationalist character of the proposed world body, and the threat to 
the full and unimpeded exercise of national sovereignty which it repre-
sented, which made American participation unpalatable to a majority, 
not only of the Senate, but of the country as well. By contrast, American 
entry into the war itself, which could be justified in purely nationalistic 
terms, had won a far greater degree of acceptance. 
The United States was prepared by 1919 for a certain amount of inter-
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national cooperation, but on its own terms and within very narrow limits. 
It was willing to discuss matters of international concern with other 
powers, as it was to do at the Washington Conference of 1921, to partic-
ipate in much, though by no means all, of the non-political work of the 
League, as it was to do increasingly during the 1920's, and to take the lead 
in a movement to outlaw war on moral grounds, so long as no positive 
action against future "outlaws" was specifically required. But it was not 
prepared at any time prior to 1940 to make binding commitments which 
suggested even remotely that this country would yield an iota of its 
sovereignty and independence to any international body or allow its poli-
cies to be directed in any way by the community of nations. As late as 
1935, the United States rejected membership in the World Court, not 
because its sovereignty actually would have been impaired by such a step, 
but merely because joining might have opened the door, at least a little, 
to genuine internationalism. 
Internationalism, if not actually a revolt against the nation state, 
involves at the very least a rejection of the idea of absolute national 
sovereignty. As such it has been basically foreign to American thought. 
The establishment and maintenance of sovereignty was the keynote of 
Washington's Farewell Address and the basis for American actions cer-
tainly until World War II. Americans paid lip-service to international-
ism on occasion, but generally envisaged nothing more than the voluntary 
cooperation of fully sovereign states, a visionary and unrealistic concept 
which masks the basic incompatibility of nationalism and international-
ism. That a nation which, for nearly two centuries, only grudgingly 
yielded the alleged sovereignty of the individual states to the power of 
the national government should be unwilling to yield a portion of na-
tional sovereignty to an international organization is natural enough, 
particularly when no pressing reasons for doing otherwise could be 
convincingly advanced. 
In practice, countries move toward internationalism only when there 
is either a widespread revulsion against nationalist excesses—as in Ger-
many immediately following World War II, when a substantial number 
of the younger generation and even some of the political leaders began 
to see themselves consciously as "Europeans" rather than "Germans"—or 
when the belief is widely accepted that the nation alone lacks the power 
and the resources to protect its own interests effectively. Neither of these 
factors applied to the United States prior to 1940. As a result, the handful 
of philosophical internationalists could gain no following. 
The expansionists, the advocates of a Pax Americana, and the be-
lievers in the natural spread of Anglo-Saxon institutions did not have to 
become political internationalists, and did not become so any more than 
did the "Hawks" of the 1960's. They could be, and largely were, ultra-
nationalists profoundly suspicious of potential limitations on American 
sovereignty which might inhibit the developments they advocated. The 
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pacifists, for their part, were internationalists only on those occasions 
when they regarded international commitments as a better guarantee 
than some form of isolation for the peace, not necessarily of the world, 
but of the United States. For most of them, these occasions were few and 
far between. And the great bulk of American leaders, and of the public, 
saw no need to embark on the troubled seas of internationalism so long 
as the security of this country was not directly threatened by events else-
where in the world. 
Internationalism on a substantial scale and of a sort that could be 
translated into policy developed in this country only after the fall of 
France raised the possibility of a physical threat to the United States 
which it would be difficult to counter unaided and alone. It was strength-
ened by the Pearl Harbor attack, the first foreign incursion on American 
soil since the War of 1812. This combination of events led not merely to 
entrance into war as in 1917, but, unlike in 1917-1920, to a general com-
mitment to internationalism in some form. "This decision which we have 
made," Cordell Hull explained in 1944, ". . . was not a decision to make 
a mere sporadic effort. . . . We cannot move in and out of international 
cooperation and in and out of participation in the responsibilities of a 
member of the family of nations.'' The American commitment to the 
United Nations and to a long series of other international arrangements 
followed. 
That commitment has survived the Cold WTar as well as the Viet Nam 
tragedy. Indeed, a good case can be made that the "Doves" of the 1960's, 
the men now urging the United States to eschew the role of world police-
man, including most of those frequently and erroneously dubbed "neo-
isolationists," have a genuine internationalist outlook. They argue, after 
all, for the subordination of American power to the larger needs of the 
world community, for the substitution of joint action, within or without 
the United Nations, for unilateral American intervention, and for the 
realization that the United States alone—and the "alone" deserves special 
emphasis—cannot hope to solve all the world's problems. They are aware, 
moreover, that in the age of ballistic missiles and the hydrogen bomb, the 
United States can no longer assure its own safety without some inter-
national commitments. 
The opposite of internationalism in terms of national conduct is uni-
lateralism. The United States remained committed to unilateralism up 
to the Second World War. It opted for collective security after that, only 
to discover that the war had destroyed any meaningful "collective" and 
left this country in a dominant leadership role. Given the enormous 
power of the United States after 1945, the tendency to interpret inter-
nationalism simply as unilateralism on a global scale manifested itself at 
various times. To that tendency there is now substantial and effective 
opposition, spawned and sustained in large part by the unhappy conse-
quences of American policy in Viet Nam. The basis for a fruitful and 
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genuine American internationalism therefore exists to a greater degree 
than ever before, and the discussion of its implications, in the realm of 
both theory and policy, is timely and essential. 
Robert A. Divine 
University of Texas, 
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I believe that Professor Herman's distinc-
tion between political and community in-
ternationalists is valid for the period of 
World War II with which I am most 
familiar, but that it is of only limited 
significance. Certainly one can identify 
community internationalists for the war years such as Michael Straight, 
editor of the New Republic and author of Make This the Last War, 
Wendell Willkie, whose One World preached a popular if fuzzy brand of 
international cooperation, and Henry Wallace, perhaps the most eloquent 
preacher of a genuine world community.1 The dominant element, how-
ever, was the political internationalist group—Sumner Welles, Cordell 
Hull, James T. Shotwell and his Commission to Study the Organization 
of Peace and John Foster Dulles, who headed up the post-war study effort 
of the National Council of Churches. Yet this group was split by a 
cleavage between "realistic" internationalists—those who accepted the 
necessity for continued national sovereignty and thus advocated only a 
limited role for a new international organization—and "idealistic" inter-
nationalists, who called for various forms of world government. During 
the war years, the realists clearly won out. The dream of a great associ-
ation of nations based on the equality of all members in which each 
surrendered some of its sovereignty gave way to the United Nations 
Organization, in which control by the great powers (advocated privately 
by Franklin Roosevelt since 1942) became the central feature.2 
My principal objection to Professor Herman's conceptual scheme is 
its failure to shed light on the actual course of American foreign policy. 
Important as community internationalists may be for a comprehension 
of the full range of internationalist thought, they had virtually no impact 
on public opinion or on the policy-making process. It was the interaction 
between idealistic and realistic political internationalists that provided 
the drama and the substance of the movement that led to the creation of 
the United Nations during World War II. 
I find myself in substantial agreement with Professor Herman's char-
acterization of the political internationalists as establishment figures who 
represented the prevailing configurations of power in twentieth-century 
America. Virtually without exception, they came from the ranks of Ivy 
League universities, New York law firms, American corporations and the 
philanthropic foundations. Realistic political internationalism was an 
expression of American capitalism, which desired a stable, orderly, non-
revolutionary world for the peaceful expansion of American power and 
influence abroad. Professor Herman's suggestion that political inter-
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nationalism was at heart an elaborate form of Pax Americana is a par-
ticularly penetrating insight. The Council on Foreign Relations, the 
Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, the Life-Time publishing 
empire built by Henry Luce—all worked for the goal of a world domi-
nated by the large industrial nations cooperating together for the ex-
ploitation of colonial areas and the preservation of a global status quo.3 
An understanding of the essentially conservative nature of political 
internationalism makes the transformation of the Wilsonian heritage 
after World War II into a blind defense of the Cold War not only pre-
dictable but inevitable. The refusal of the Soviet Union to fit docilely 
into its assigned role—most evident in the Russian insistence on creating 
its own security zone in Eastern Europe—undermined the United Nations. 
Reacting to Soviet intransigence, American political internationalists 
simply changed the collective security concept from a universal into a 
regional one. This fundamental alteration of the nature of collective 
security, foreshadowed as early as 1945 by Arthur Vandenberg's insistence 
at the San Francisco Conference on a regional loophole in the UN Char-
ter, permitted the political internationalists to disguise the fact that the 
North Atlantic Treaty Organization was an old-fashioned military alli-
ance and instead to portray it to the American public as a variant of 
collective security in the Wilsonian tradition.4 Although some inter-
nationalists decried John Foster Dulles's formation of SEATO and 
CENTO in the 1950's, his proliferation of alliance systems in an effort to 
encircle Russia was but the logical extension of the new twist internation-
alists had given to "collective security." 
When political internationalism is viewed as American imperialism 
in disguise, the reason for the lack of debate over the objectives of Amer-
ican foreign policy in the 1940's and 1950's becomes clear. The political 
internationalists who had supported the creation of the UN—Dean 
Acheson, John Foster Dulles, Arthur Vandenberg, Harry S. Truman— 
now became the advocates of a get tough policy toward the Soviet Union. 
The few critics of containment—Walter Lippmann, Robert A. Taft, 
Henry A. Wallace—had all opposed the "realistic" form of political inter-
nationalism which had led to the creation of the UN. Lippmann had 
championed a division of the world into spheres of influence during the 
war, Taft had warned repeatedly against an adventurous policy of inter-
national collaboration, and Wallace had been the foremost community 
internationalist, advocating a "people's revolution" that would usher in 
"the century of the common man." All three opposed the policy of con-
tainment in 1947 with varying degrees of failure—Lippmann's book, The 
Cold War, went virtually unnoticed until rediscovered by revisionist 
historians in the 1960's; Republican internationalists used the political 
popularity of Dwight D. Eisenhower to deny Taft the Presidential nomi-
nation so many in his party felt he deserved in 1952; and Truman and 
the Democratic internationalists smeared Henry Wallace as a communist 
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dupe in the 1948 election, thereby driving from public life the most out-
spoken and influential community internationalist.5 By silencing these 
critics, the political internationalists established a Cold War consensus 
that ended meaningful discussion of American foreign policy for nearly 
two decades.6 
In a very real sense, political internationalists transformed the Wilson-
ian concept of collective security into a justification for military alliances 
by which the United States assumed the role of world policeman. His-
torians might well find Professor Herman's insight into the conservative 
implications of political internationalism of crucial assistance in explain-
ing how the United States came to deny its own ideals in the world after 
World War II. 
In the search for insight into the devel-
opment and dilemmas of American inter-
nationalists, Sonclra Herman's distinctions 
between "political internationalists" (or 
"institutionalists") and "community inter-
nationalists" are useful. One difference 
particularly merits emphasis. "Political internationalists" included 
prominent members of the American legal, political and corporate life; 
that is, they had risen successfully within the system by understanding 
how to control its institutions and make those institutions respond to 
their personal interest and, a logical extension, from this personal interest 
to what they perceived to be the national interest. In a real sense they 
were not internationalists at all, but nationalists who searched for an 
international arena in which American institutions could expand and 
prosper. 
"Community internationalists," however, moved out of a reform 
movement that pivoted around the individual or around classes victim-
ized by the American dream, rather than primarily focusing on national 
institutions. Indeed they sought to bypass such institutions by creating 
an international consciousness and supranational agencies which could 
work outside the traditional assumptions of nation-states. Such a bypass 
might have led to a fruitful journey had they tried to detour around 
domestic institutions of a third-rate power. Since they belonged to the 
superpower of the twentieth century, however, the "community inter-
nationalists" found themselves, if not in a series of political deadends, 
then establishing international agencies which scarcely touched the dy-
namics of the United States foreign policies and those of the other leading 
nation-states. 
Such dilemmas are not new to American reformers. Their ability to 
repeat mistakes is eloquent testimony to their inability to understand the 
past. William Lloyd Garrison exemplified the dilemma in 1830 when he 




His country, of course, was not like the world, and his countrymen, 
especially in the South and Midwest, were atypical of, for example, the 
successful British abolitionists. Like many American reformers, Garrison 
loved an impassioned moral appeal, but it was valueless in terms of find-
ing levers to make changes, for the nation-state was where the power was, 
and is, located. He was admitting, moreover, that his own nation was not 
in sympathy with him; Garrison consequently tried the traditional bypass 
of appealing to a larger world body which, unfortunately for him, had no 
substance or authority. When change finally occurred, neither Garrison 
nor the equally irrelevant Emerson or Thoreau played important roles. 
For good or ill, men such as Lincoln, Rockefeller and Root, who knew 
how to operate the nation's politico-economic institutions, forced the 
changes and reordered the society. 
By the century's turn most American reformers drifted in the main-
stream of the labor movement, Progressivism or anti-imperialist organi-
zations, thereby working in fact within the assumptions established by 
the "institutionalists." Or else a few followed the course of Eugene Debs. 
But Debs does not fall into the category of either "political international-
ist" or "community internationalist." He is of little consequence to the 
development of American internationalism, which may be one reason 
why he should be studied. While internationalists of various persuasions 
were assuming (or, more accurately, hoping) their country was the world, 
Debs set to work on the mundane but more useful task of analyzing and 
attempting to modify fundamentally the institutions of his home country. 
He apparently understood what few American reformers have compre-
hended: internationalism is the final, not the first step of reform; and 
internationalism, in the sense that reformers from Garrison through the 
1960's student movements used the term, is irrelevant to the more funda-
mental need of altering, which means initially understanding, domestic 
institutions. With a few exceptions such as Debs, American reformers 
have successfully avoided the difficult problem of institutional change by 
emphasizing the individual (as Garrison, Emerson, Thoreau), attempting 
to alter the society by laboring outside its key institutions (as the Social 
Gospelers), or trying to leap over the problem to work on the supposedly 
more exalted level of international institutions. 
The "political internationalists," or "institutionalists" (domestic as 
well as international) have not made such errors. Moving up within the 
domestic system, they understood that this arena's instruments of politics, 
finance, religion and education formed part of a larger theater whose 
stability and prosperity was necessary for their own and their nation's 
wellbeing. They therefore carefully defined their relationships to the 
larger theater. At first the "institutionalists" focused on the Western 
Hemisphere and the working out of profitable economic ties rather than 
entangling political alliances. Root's highly-publicized tour of Latin 
America while he was Secretary of State exemplified this initial step. The 
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Mexican Revolution, World War I and the Russian Revolution forced 
an expansion of the policy until it became global in 1919. Again the 
dynamic was to be economic power, not politics, and when after the Paris 
Conference the League of Nations structure shakingly rested on a Franco-
American Security Pact, and an Article X which some internationalists 
feared would commit the United States to fighting colonial wars for the 
British and French, many "political internationalists" belied their label 
and helped kill the treaty. 
Between the wars Henry Stimson, who in many ways inherited the 
power and world view of Root, sought desperately for a makeshift series 
of alliances outside the League. This search finally collapsed during the 
critical months of the Manchurian Crisis in 1931-1932 when the British 
Foreign Office refused to cooperate in threatening the Japanese. As the 
League disintegrated, many "political internationalists" concentrated on 
restoring once again their domestic institutions within the larger frame-
work of global stability. Historians persist in terming the interwar Amer-
ican policy one of isolationism. The results of such labeling have been 
interesting, particularly in the scholarly emphasis upon superficial polit-
ical arrangements (while the economic and social substructures have been 
relatively neglected); and also in the picking up of the "isolationist" term 
by Presidents Johnson and Nixon to rationalize their own international-
ism. These Presidents have taken the word out of its proper 1930's con-
text, but they are not to blame, for historians' simplistic use of the word 
allows a larger political misuse. (It seems particularly unfortunate that 
this traditional understanding of "isolationism," moreover, has prevented 
scholars from gaining sufficient insight into the impact which the Amer-
ican economic dilemmas of the 1920's and 1930's had on other societies. 
Such information would perhaps be helpful in comprehending the effect 
the United States is having in the world-wide Revolution of Autonomy 
which has especially shaken the former colonial areas of Africa and Asia 
during the 1960's.) 
When the world again needed reordering in 1945 the opportunity 
was more propitious than any American internationalist had ever dared 
dream. With a monopoly of atomic power, unchallenged economic 
superiority, and two industrial heartlands of Japan and Western Europe 
dependent upon American beneficence, the Truman Administration, led 
in the foreign policy realm by Dean Acheson, had the golden chance of 
making the world safe for the United States institutional system. 
Acheson's internationalism, however, reached only as far as American 
economic and military power allowed him to influence policy. This essen-
tially meant that it reached to Japan and Western and Central Europe 
but not to the other areas represented in the United Nations. Acheson 
correctly understood that the international organization could contain 
neither the dynamic of American superiority nor the ensuing Soviet-
American struggle. He consequently had few compunctions in cooper-
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ating with a crucial policy change in 1945 which removed postwar relief 
from the international agency of UNRRA and channeled it into bilateral 
agencies controlled by the United States; or in undermining the inter-
national organization with the Truman Doctrine and Marshall Plan that 
worked outside UN auspices; or in resisting Communist aggression in 
Korea, a three-year struggle in which the United Nations acted as an 
American surrogate; or, finally, in pushing through the Uniting for Peace 
Resolution of 1950 which created the fiction that the General Assembly 
(where Costa Rica, Albania, etc., voted equally with the two big powers) 
had by grace of the Resolution taken power from the Security Council 
where the world powers exercised a veto. The irony of this last event for 
the development of American internationalism might be greater than 
historians suspect, for it would be useful to see which American inter-
nationalist groups, if any, protested this veiling of reality and under-
mining of U.N. power. Since the Resolution rested on supposed demo-
cratic voting processes, and as it clearly was in American interest to be 
able to bypass the Soviet veto in the Security Council, one can guess that 
very few internationalist groups in the United States understood, let alone 
protested, what Acheson did. 
The pretension of working through the United Nations while actually 
weakening it could continue only until American unilateral power was 
blocked within and without the organization. This in fact developed 
during the 1960's in the battlefields of Vietnam, the council rooms of 
NATO, and the voting on the American resolution of whether both 
mainland China and Taiwan should be in the United Nations. This 
disciplining of American unilateralism, it must be noted, did not come 
primarily from American reformers and/or internationalists, but was 
imposed by other peoples in the world who used their own institutions to 
counter American power. With these defeats, which placed the United 
States in a world position closer to that of 1921 than 1947, the Johnson 
and Nixon administrations reverted to policies reminiscent of the inter-
war era when, as at the Washington Conference of 1921 and the 1924 
Dawes economic discussions, the major powers gathered outside supra-
national or truly global organizations and privately adjusted relationships 
of their domestic institutions to those of the few other major powers. 
During the twentieth century the internationalist concepts initiated 
by Root had been unsuccessfully adjusted by Stimson, dazzlingly trans-
formed by Acheson, and then narrowed and carried to one logical con-
clusion of unilateralism by John Foster Dulles and Henry Kissinger. 
Although several of these men, particularly Root and Dulles, believed at 
one time in the possibilities of international legal machinery, they either 
modified or dropped this faith when they perceived that such machinery 
might severely restrict American self-interest or, as between 1945 and the 
mid-1960's, the United States could go-it-alone without needing the 
machinery. 
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One constant throughout this drama of the "political international-
ists" was their commitment to the primacy of American domestic insti-
tutions. International organizations, in their view, were either to replicate 
or serve those institutions. Other nations in the world have refused to 
play the game according to such ground-rules. Unfortunately, American 
reformers have been in no position to be of much help in creating a more 
equitable international system. We now know enough about Jane Ad-
dams to suggest that Eugene Debs is preferable as a historical example; 
for that matter, so is Henry Adams. Neither Debs nor Adams confused 
the priorities. And neither have the peoples in Southeast Asia, Western 
Europe and Latin America who have blunted American power. These 
peoples have agreed with the "political internationalists" such as Root 
that an equitable international system begins at home. After this point, 
unfortunately for the United States, their paths have sharply diverged. 
Richard D. McKinzie 
University of Missouri 
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University of Kansas 
Did the Cold War kill American inter-
nationalism? Was belief in the future of 
the United Nations, which appeared quite 
strong and popular after World War II, 
anything more than an emotional reaction 
to the War itself? Was it an acceptance of 
responsibility in the world, or an escape 
from it? When did this belief in effective United Nations action dis-
appear? Did Americans begin to identify American police action with 
internationalism around the time of the Korean War? 
Sondra Herman's interrogations about American internationalism in 
the formative period of the Cold War are thoughtful and point to impor-
tant issues. However, questions that emphasize the centrality of the 
United Nations are not wholly satisfactory, for they ignore a significant 
dimension of internationalist thought in this period. Commitment to the 
United Nations was, perhaps, the litmus test of America's conversion 
from isolation; but it did not reflect any serious interest in sacrificing 
national sovereignty to some larger concept of human loyalty or in supra-
national approaches to political realities. Whatever faith in institu-
tional internationalism American leaders possessed, the small group of 
visionaries who sat on the Department of State's planning committees, the 
political leaders who claimed responsibility for the nation's welfare and 
who had to explain their actions to the public hedged their loyalties from 
the beginning. For example, one month before the delegations assembled 
in San Franciso, the United States engineered a meeting in Mexico with 
Latin American nations for the purpose of developing much narrower 
schemes of regional cooperation. The obvious explanation is that Presi-
dents Roosevelt and Truman's advisers lacked faith in the United Nations 
and viewed regional agreements as necessary insurance policies in the 
likely event that the United Nations failed. 
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The guardians of American national interests, of course, did not 
completely despair of working for peace through the United Nations. 
They viewed it as a valuable tool, as a useful, even necessary, forum for 
the reduction of tensions and promotion of understanding among the 
world's peoples. The United Nations was one means by which peace 
(some would add justice) would be gained; it was not an end in itself. 
Business spokesmen, many Congressmen, leaders of philanthropic and 
religious organizations, and "professional internationalists" shared this 
assessment of the United Nations' role. The Federal Council of Churches' 
Commission on a Just and Durable Peace, for example, urged in 1947 
"greater use of the United Nations . . . as a place where the conduct of 
nations can be submitted to the moral judgment of world opinion."1 For 
the Commission and others, the United Nations was not the "universal 
solvent" for which internationalists supposedly were forever searching. 
Senator Arthur H. Vandenberg, a staunch supporter of American partic-
ipation in the U.N., never believed the organization was "created or 
equipped" to handle all or even most conflicts between nations. When 
Greece was torn by political and economic chaos in early 1947, Vanden-
berg said: "I am frank to say that I think Greece could collapse fifty 
times before the UN itself could ever hope to handle a situation of this 
nature."2 A year later John Foster Dulles, the architect of that inter-
nationalist, bipartisan Republican foreign policy that Vandenberg exe-
cuted, wrote in a draft of the party platform: "We support the United 
Nations and will not by-pass it in matters within its competence."3 It was 
not that Vandenberg, Dulles and the multitude of others who considered 
themselves internationalists were acquiescing fatalistically in the demise 
of earlier dreams; rather, the blow was not mortal, because the United 
Nations had never been the principal repository of their hopes for just 
and lasting peace. 
Many, perhaps most, American leaders and spokesmen for the "im-
portant public" between 1943 and 1948 shared a view of the world—as 
naively emotional, Utopian and obscurantist as the Wilsonian vision at 
its most extreme—best termed "economic internationalism." This group 
shared above all an aggressively nationalistic approach to international 
affairs, often consciously defining the needs of the world community in 
terms of United States interests and needs. This chauvinistic attitude was 
in large part the result of the Second World War, especially the global 
involvement thrust upon America by the war. Arthur Ekirch, Jr. has 
observed with enviable perspicacity that by 1945 Americans had become 
"supremely confident" of the nation's strength and were "ill-prepared to 
accept any . . . challenge to United States world leadership. . . . In the 
fervor of their recent conversion from isolationism to internationalism, 
the American public was all too frequently blind to the fact that their 
own new views often only projected older nationalistic prejudices upon a 
world stage."4 The productive capacity generated during the war had 
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transformed the United States into a superpower, and American leaders, 
supremely conscious of America's economic preeminence, determined to 
use it to bring about universal peace and prosperity. 
For a time, American leaders believed lasting peace was to be obtained 
by an all-out, aggressive effort led by the United States. "We must wage 
peace just as we have waged total war," President Truman told his friend 
Fred Vinson in the last months of 1945.5 How did one "wage" peace, 
which Americans traditionally had negatively defined, as "the absence or 
cessation of war, strife, or discord?" It appears that what the President 
and his advisers intended when they spoke of "waging peace" was the 
implementation of an economic foreign policy designed to create and 
maintain a stable and prosperous environment in which universal peace 
would flourish. 
The chief influences upon American internationalism were what hap-
pened to the great power consensus and the open economic arrangements 
which were to undergird the United Nations. The importance of the 
collapse of the Allied wartime coalition is obvious. Since it was grounded 
upon the assumption of mutual trust, the United Nations' success, as 
Senator Vandenberg stated, depended upon "the temperature of Soviet-
American relationships."6 Antagonism born of the frigid breath of mis-
understanding and political hostility combined with a second source of 
frustration: the inability of the United States to bring into existence a 
world economic order. This combination produced, during the critical 
formative years of the postwar era, a self-righteous and uncritical identi-
fication of international peace and harmony with perceived American 
interests. 
An effort to realize an open economic world had been presaged by 
views about the causes of international strife developed during the long 
tenure of Franklin D. Roosevelt. Secretary of State Cordell Hull for 
many years had advocated a policy of international economic cooperation. 
Persuaded that conflicts of economic interests were the base cause of al-
most all international difficulties, Hull gathered around him a group of 
kindred spirits to draw up a blueprint for a stable, prosperous world 
order. Hull and his colleagues, and likeminded men throughout the 
government, possessed an economic vision of the postwar world. 
It was believed a system of unrestricted international trade would en-
sure more efficient production of goods, higher living standards through-
out the world, and thus bring about world peace, because every nation 
would have a stake in the economic well-being of every other nation. As 
Harry Dexter White stated some years later: 
The people of the United States and the United Nations 
have agreed on a program in which countries cooperate to 
maintain peace and prosperity. . . . This program recog-
nizes that it is not enough to get countries to agree on polit-
ical cooperation. That is important, of course. But we must 
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do more than that. We must support all our efforts for 
peace by providing an environment of stability and order in 
international economic relations. We must remove the eco-
nomic causes of conflict. In such an environment, peace can 
flourish.7 
When American planners talked of waging peace, they were referring 
to the task of creating a system of international trade which returned the 
world to that "golden age" before state trading arrangements and prefer-
ential tariffs. 
Theoreticians at every level of government were agreed that the 
United States must take the initiative. They also were agreed in not 
foreseeing great problems of implementation. The problems the world 
would face after the war, these men assumed, would be primarily finan-
cial. Voicing the general opinion, Under-Secretary of State Will L. 
Clayton did not believe that the earth's resources were too meager nor 
available production facilities too devastated or worn down to permit 
rapid reconstruction and resumption of normal patterns of commerce. 
What was envisioned was a short period of rebuilding—two years at the 
most—followed by a return to a high level of commercial activity and 
universal prosperity. This would be good for America and good for the 
world, since prosperous nations were unlikely to disturb the peace. If 
such ideas appear hopelessly Utopian in light of the economic shambles 
resulting from the war, it is not difficult to demonstrate that they perme-
ated the administration Truman inherited in April, 1945. 
No important bureaucrat opposed American participation in the 
United Nations or preached the virtues of tariff walls and economic iso-
lation. Donald M. Nelson, FDR's War Production Board chief, believed 
that the interdepenclency of the United States with the rest of the world 
had come to be "a universally accepted premise." Nelson advised Presi-
dent Truman that returning soldiers would find jobs only if new markets 
could be found for American products; these markets could "only be 
found in countries whose purchasing power is growing, as a result of their 
economic development."8 Another official stated bluntly that the United 
States would be turning out twice the volume of goods produced in 1939 
and would "need to look to outlets for our products on a scale vastly 
larger than ever before." He concluded: "Closed factories, rusty plows, 
idle capital, and widespread unemployment breed war and revolution as 
well as depression."0 
Awareness of these pressures did not in itself ensure that solutions 
would be forthcoming. American planners were confident that they had 
the key; unfortunately, neither they nor the political leaders who ap-
proved their program for waging—and winning—the peace realized, until 
it was too late, that the tasks of clearing away the debris of war and of 
reviving world trade overreached the capacity of the instruments Amer-
icans had constructed for these jobs. As well, U.S. planners failed to grasp 
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that the creation of international financial institutions was only a partial 
response to problems that transcended temporary monetary maladjust-
ments, problems that were political, psychological, even ethical in na-
ture! The United States championed the creation of two institutions 
with limited powers, the International Bank for Reconstruction and 
Development and the International Monetary Fund. It was assumed that 
these agencies would be able to satisfy necessary requirements for read-
justment to peacetime patterns of trade and essential economic develop-
ment. It was recognized that relief for the victims of the war would for a 
time require substantial outlays by the United States. American leaders 
decided, therefore, that minimum relief would be dispensed through 
UNRRA, to be phased out when short-term reconstruction loans and the 
forces generated by the IBRD and the IMF to rationalize world trade 
brought full recovery. Had the anticipated postwar cooperation of the 
wartime Allies continued, had Congress been as generous as during the 
war, and, perhaps most significant, had that "golden age" of free and 
expanding trade that American planners sought to restore ever existed in 
fact, these policies might have worked. 
That they failed was explained in part by the inability of Americans 
to understand that economic actions may have (or may be perceived by 
others as having) political motivations. American statesmen were entirely 
sincere when they stated that multilateral liberalization of trade would 
bring peace and prosperity to all the world. However, a policy to pro-
mote the free flow of goods and capital and to expand production, viewed 
from London, Moscow and elsewhere, would first benefit the United 
States. What country emerged from the war with unimpaired productive 
facilities? The United States. What nation possessed surplus capacity in 
almost every economic sector? The United States. Americans might claim 
reassuringly that the lead enjoyed by the U.S. was a temporary phenom-
enon and would disappear as the supply-demand cycle came into oper-
ation. But efforts to obtain an "open door" everywhere before recon-
struction was accomplished were hardly reassuring, and the inability of 
the Roosevelt and Truman administrations to grasp this fact heightened 
the tension between America and its erstwhile allies. 
Even in late 1946 the Truman administration was refusing to abandon 
the vision of a prosperous, peaceful world, believing that if "moral 
stamina" would suffice, the vision could be attained. Of course, it was not 
that simple. Victory over the Axis had created a new mood in Washing-
ton and in Moscow, and domestic priorities and interests forced American 
leaders to chart a new course. The American public longed to return to 
what was thought of as "normal" life; for many a prerequisite of "nor-
malcy" was to have their wartime allies and enemies "get off the U.S. 
taxpayer's back." American leaders watched helplessly and in genuine 
puzzlement as domestic apathy and the deepening rift with the Russians 
upset their program for a peaceful, prosperous world. Plans in progress 
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bogged down. It took Congress six months to authorize the British loan. 
When it did pass, the reasons were less that Britain needed the money 
and that aid would serve the economic aims of the United States than 
that the money would enable Britain to continue its stand against Soviet 
pressure in the Mediterranean and Middle East. The uncertainties of 
power politics delayed the opening of the IBRD until May, 1947, and 
U.S. support for the International Trade Organization faltered. By 1947 
the nations of Western Europe were still in desperate trouble, spending 
a large part of their resources on relief instead of trade-generating recon-
struction. Economic forecasters in the U.S. were saying that the recon-
version of the American economy was complete, and that most of the 
savings of the war years had been released. In this atmosphere of crisis 
the Marshall Plan emerged from the Policy Planning Staff of the State 
Department. Its creators proceeded from radically different assumptions 
than existed during and immediately after the war. The Marshall Plan 
was, in one sense, a device to provide the assistance for Western Europe's 
reconstruction that should have been given—and Americans had thought 
they were giving—in 1943-1946. But the rationale for the Marshall Plan 
was political (anti-communist), not economic. When the nations of West-
ern Europe institutionalized their partnership with the United States by 
forming the Organization for European Economic Cooperation in 1948, 
the economic internationalists' vision of one world—prosperous and at 
peace—disappeared. 
One result was a significant change in the approach of Americans to 
the solution of international conflict. Except for "purists" in the Treas-
ury Department and some few others, American internationalists accepted 
the division of the world into two spheres and proceeded to erect new 
strategies upon that fact. Reflecting the change in attitude, a Treasury 
official wrote in August, 1947: 
The whole is the peace of the world which America is 
obliged to undertake. But it must be a peace in which the 
security of America is above all and in which we shall be 
able insofar as possible to help the rest of the world ap-
proach our standards of living, economic and spiritual. It is 
not our desire to change the political systems of others, but 
to retain our own which we hope others will approach and 
copy. . . . Therefore, we must always have in mind the 
strategic position of the United States in this power struggle 
between two great systems in order that we shall retain our 
supremacy and thus be enabled to weld together all of the 
world on some common ground.10 
Emphasis was placed on Europe as a battleground between two com-
peting economic and political systems. Economic internationalists were 
persuaded to abandon the dream of an open economic world in favor of 
an attempt to create a similar "environment" in that portion of the globe 
which was "free," i.e., non-communist. Their emotional faith in the 
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superiority of American institutions was transferred to a smaller stage, 
Europe. 
It may be that the reduction in scope produced an intensification of 
the implicit self-righteousness and aggressiveness underlying United 
States policy, and that when events again forced Americans to think 
"globally," they automatically equated United States intervention any-
where in the world with the larger aims of internationalism. If so, the 
road to that assumption ran from the commitment to economic inter-
nationalism, to the idea of waging peace, which was so important in the 
years 1943-1948. 
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